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ABSTRACT 
Initial coin offerings are a source of controversy in the world 
of startup fundraising, and their legality is, at best, an open 
question. Amid soaring valuations and rumors of looming SEC 
action, investors and issuers alike are scrambling to forge a path 
forward for the token-based startups of tomorrow. While issuers 
may soon be forced to comply with United States securities laws, 
the existing regime is inadequate because it does not allow 
startups to capture the unique benefits of coin sales and, more 
importantly, it does not allow eager American investors to take 
part in funding the world’s next generation of technology 
companies. 
INTRODUCTION 
 In July of 2013,1 Mastercoin (now Omni Layer),2 a digital 
currency and communications protocol platform, conducted the world’s 
first Initial Coin Offering (ICO). The amount raised in the offering was 
modest—a mere $3.15 million—and featured only about 500 participants.3 
In the four years since, however, ICOs have become enormously popular, 
growing far beyond their meager beginnings. In January 2018 alone, fewer 
than thirty-five ICOs raised nearly $800 million.4 
                                               
† Duke University School of Law, J.D./LL.M. in Law & Entrepreneurship 
expected May, 2019; B.A. in History, University of Pennsylvania, May, 2013. 
1 Vitalik Buterin, Mastercoin: A Second-Generation Protocol on the Bitcoin 
Blockchain, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Nov. 4, 2013, 5:15 PM), https://bitcoinmagaz 
ine.com/articles/mastercoin-a-second-generation-protocol-on-the-bitcoin-
blockchain-1383603310/. 
2 OMNI LAYER, http://www.omnilayer.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
3 Jasper Hamill, Fed Up with Bitcoin? Here’s How to Start Your Own Currency, 
FORBES (Nov. 30, 2013, 11:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
jasperhamill/2013/11/30/fed-up-with-bitcoin-heres-how-to-start-your-own-
currency/#7c7cf9ad7909.  
4 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2018, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule 
.com/stats.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
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 With this surge in popularity, analysts have increasingly voiced 
concerns about fraud, volatility and the possibility of a dangerous bubble 
in the ICO market.5 Financial regulators around the world have been slow 
to act,6 given that these offerings are, by definition, conducted via 
decentralized cryptocurrencies that have no foundation in traditional 
banking. Savvy startups, fearing an impending crackdown, have rushed 
their coins to market, fueling huge valuations and generating splashy 
headlines about high-profile controversies.7 
 By the beginning of 2018, many regulatory agencies began to 
more carefully scrutinize ICOs.8 The SEC took action against some 
allegedly fraudulent offerings,9 while a few Asian countries (most notably, 
China) enacted freezes on all new ICOs.10 The “Wild West”11 of coin 
fundraising is likely in its twilight, but increased regulation does not 
necessarily mean that ICOs will go away. Without a change in the 
regulatory landscape, startups will structure their offerings to comply with 
existing securities laws, which could eliminate many of the benefits of 
conducting an ICO in the first place. What follows is an examination of 
the characteristics of the typical initial coin offerings, the existing 
regulatory space in which startup fundraising occurs in the United States, 
and proposals for updating securities laws for the age of the ICO. 
 
                                               
5 John Koetsier, ICO Bubble? Startups Are Raising Hundreds of Millions of 
Dollars via Initial Coin Offerings, INC. (July 14, 2017), https://www.inc.com/ 
john-koetsier/ico-bubble-startups-are-raising-hundreds-of-millio.html.  
6 Jacek Czarnecki, ICOs in the EU: How Will the ‘Slow Giant’ Regulate 
Tokens?, COINDESK (July 24, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/icos-eu-will-
slow-giant-regulate-tokens/. 
7 Paul Vigna, Tezos Raised $232 Million in a Hot Coin Offering, Then a Fight 
Broke Out, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 19, 2017),    https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/tezos-raised-232-million-in-a-hot-coin-offering-then-a-fight-broke-out-
1508354704.  
8 Stan Higgins, SEC: US Securities Law ‘May Apply’ to Token Sales, COINDESK 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/securities-exchange-commission-us-
securities-laws-may-apply-token-sales/.  
9 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Emergency Action 
Halts ICO Scam (Dec. 4 2017) (on file with author). 
10 Jon Russell, China Has Banned ICOs, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/04/chinas-central-bank-has-banned-icos/.  
11Initial Coin Offering (ICO) – The Wild West of Fundraising, YAHOO FINANCE 
(November 23, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/initial-coin-offering-ico-
wild-092102222.html. 
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I. RAISING CAPITAL WITH AN INITIAL COIN OFFERING 
A. How ICOs work 
 ICOs are not a radical or complicated concept.  At their base, they 
simply exchange newly-created “coins” or “tokens” for an established 
currency (e.g. Ethereum,12 Bitcoin,13 or even U.S. dollars). These “coins” 
enable holders to participate in a market that a startup is trying to establish. 
Crucially, most companies are not issuing “coins” as an end to themselves, 
i.e. with the sole purpose of becoming a new currency. Rather, many have 
a stand-alone product for which they require customers to pay in the 
startup’s own unique digital token. 
 As an example, Privatix is a decentralized, autonomous peer-to-
peer VPN network company built on blockchain14 technology15 that has 
raised capital with an ICO.16 Privatix allows individuals with internet-
connected devices to sell their spare bandwidth to other users. The only 
method of payment that buyers of bandwidth are allowed to use on the 
system is the “coin” (PRIX) that Privatix is offering in its ICO. PRIX, 
therefore, serves a functional purpose by allowing users to buy and sell 
bandwidth on the Privatix system.  
 From a different perspective, these coins serve as an investment 
vehicle. If Privatix becomes the world’s leader in peer-to-peer VPN 
technology, PRIX will have enormous value, just as the dollar is valuable 
partially because it is the only acceptable currency in the United States. 
This functional-investment duality of digital coins is what makes them so 
difficult to regulate. If coins are merely functional, they are no more 
securities than they are keys to open a door. If they are investment 
vehicles, however, coin sales must be registered with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
B. Network Effects 
                                               
12 See generally, Ameer Rosic, What is Ethereum? A Step-by-Step Beginner’s 
Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/ethereum/ (explaining 
Ethereum’s underlying technology and uses).  
13 See generally, Justin Jaffe, What is Bitcoin? Here’s Everything You Need to 
Know, CNET, https://www.cnet.com/how-to/what-is-bitcoin/ (explaining what 
Bitcoin is and how it functions as a cryptocurrency).  
14 See generally, Rob Marvin, Blockchain: The Invisible Technology That’s 
Changing the World, PCMAG, https://www.pcmag.com/article/ 
351486/blockchain-the-invisible-technology-thats-changing-the-wor (detailing, 
at a general level, the uses and functionality of blockchain technology).  
15 PRIVATIX, LTD., https://privatix.com/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
16 Privatix ICO (PRIX), COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com 
/icos/e1192/privatix-ico.html. 
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Before introducing the regulatory framework within which ICOs 
exist, it is useful to mention the impact of network effects and their 
potential benefits for companies conducting an ICO.17 Many ICOs, in 
addition to raising capital, also create a proprietary market in which users 
have only one method of payment available. The holders of that method 
of payment face a choice: they may either (1) attempt to exchange their 
coins for some other form of currency by finding a willing buyer, or (2) 
participate in the market created by the issuer of the coin. Although they 
may also hold the coin for an indefinite period, hoping to eventually realize 
its value, this merely delays the same choice. Therefore, when 
participating in the new economy, the holder of a brand-new, proprietary 
coin faces high switching costs because she cannot participate in her 
chosen market using any other currency. If she switches to a different 
method of payment, she will be shut out and unable to buy or sell within 
the market. 
Conversely, the larger the market is, the more value the coins will 
possess, given the power of network effects. High switching costs result 
in profound capture of potential customers, whose best avenue to realizing 
value from their purchased coins is to participate in the startup company’s 
market. The shared incentive to participate simultaneously multiplies the 
uses (and therefore, value) of the coins for everyone.  
Consequently, a company has a strong incentive to conduct an 
ICO not only to raise capital, but also to accumulate as many buyers as 
possible, creating a large and robust market. The more holders of the 
issued coins, the more potential participants there are for the startup’s new 
market, and increased participants generate increased revenue for the 
issuer. If the market functions well and provides access to a quality product 
or service, a high demand for the digital coin will follow. Capturing the 
benefits of their proprietary coins’ high switching costs and network 
effects make these companies’ goals in conducting an ICO much more 
nuanced than a “traditional” startup’s capital raise. 
II. REGULATING ICOS 
 The continued lack of regulation of initial coin offerings will 
depend on whether the SEC determines that all coins are securities. The 
Securities Act of 1933 (“the ’33 Act”) was enacted with the purpose of 
“regulat[ing] [the] sale of securities in interstate commerce.”18 “Security” 
                                               
17 See William J. Luther, Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, and Switching 
Costs, 34 CONTEMP.  ECON. POL’Y.  553–71 (detailing that while network effects 
are currently inhibiting the growth of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, they 
stand to benefit cryptocurrencies in the future).  
18 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2012). 
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was defined as, among many other things, “any note, stock, treasury stock, 
bond, debenture, . . . [or] investment contract.”19 The long list in the statute 
suggests a broad scope of what may be considered a “security,” and thus 
subject to regulation. Such a flexible standard has allowed courts to label 
new articles of speculation and investment “securities” as they have 
emerged, rather than depending on legislative action.  
 The most broadly-interpreted term in the definition of security has 
been “investment contract.” Over the last eighty-five years, a wide range 
of contracts, including a contract to cultivate units of a citrus grove 
development20 and even a leasing agreement for payphones with a fixed 
rate of return,21 have been determined to fall within the definition. If the 
coins of ICOs are determined to be “securities,” it will most likely be 
because they are determined to be “investment contracts.”  
A. What Is an Investment Contract? 
 The test for determining what constitutes an “investment contract” 
comes from the 1946 U.S. Supreme Court decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey 
Company.22 The Court applied a test (“the Howey test”) to the contract in 
question to determine whether it fell within the ‘33 Act’s definition of 
“investment contract.” As refined by later courts,23 the Howey test has four 
factors, each of which must be satisfied for a transaction to be considered 
an “investment contract” and, thus, a “security”:24 
1. It is an investment of money; 
2. The investment of money is in a common enterprise; 
3. Any profit comes from the efforts of a promotor or 
third party; and  
4. There is an expectation of profits from the 
investment. 
 The third and fourth factors are often combined into “an 
expectation of profit that comes as a result of the efforts of a third party.” 
Additionally, the term “money” has been interpreted by courts to include 
                                               
19 15 U.S.C. § 77b. 
20 See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
21 See S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).  
22 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
23 See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (refining 
Howey’s “investment of money” prong). 
24 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.  
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many assets other than cash.25  Beginning with Howey, the Supreme Court 
has generally embraced the substance of the ’33 Act’s definition of 
“security” over its form,26 paving the way for the SEC to exercise broad 
powers over a wide-ranging array of transactions.  
 There is disagreement among analysts as to whether the coins used 
in ICOs satisfy the Howey test. Some prominent commentators have 
suggested that the functionality of some types of coins puts them solidly 
outside the category of investment contracts.27 This reasoning relies 
principally on case law that distinguishes assets possessing primarily 
consumptive uses from those that have primarily investment purposes,28 
the result being that assets with consumptive uses are not deemed 
securities. Therefore, the argument goes, coins that can be shown to have 
consumptive rather than investment purposes necessarily fail the Howey 
test. 
 According to these commentators, purchasers of “already-
functional” coins—coins that grant access to a system and are already in 
use prior to the ICO—might not have an expectation of profit, and, thus, 
these coins fail the fourth prong of Howey.29 While it may be true that these 
purchasers are receiving something that has a function, however, many 
initial coin offerings feature “pre-functional” coins. In this context, the 
coin typically has yet to acquire the functionality that purchasers are 
hoping for when buying. Thus, the price of the coin reflects the lack of 
functionality. That being said, even the most innocent purchasers likely 
expect this functionality to develop and for the value of the coin to 
increase, giving them a profit. Therefore, even if it exempts “already-
functional” coins, it seems very likely that the SEC will classify most coins 
as securities.  
B. 2017 SEC Guidance 
 The SEC tipped its hand early in the second quarter of 2017. On 
July 25th, the SEC released an investigative report on The DAO, a 
“Decentralized Autonomous Organization” created by the German 
                                               
25 See, e.g., Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976) (“an ‘investment 
of money’ means only that the investor must commit his assets to the enterprise 
in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss”). 
26 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (emphasizing that in state blue sky laws that were 
contemporary to the ’33 Act, “[f]orm was disregarded for substance”). 
27 See Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token 
Sale Framework, PROTOCOL LABS (2017),https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-
Project-Whitepaper.pdf. 
28 See id. (citing jurisprudence that suggests a lack of investment purpose when 
purchasing commodities, such as silver or gold). 
29 Id. 
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corporation Slock.it.30 The report claimed that the The DAO was an 
example of “a ‘virtual’ organization embodied in computer code and 
executed on a distributed ledger or blockchain.”31 Its purpose was to invest 
in “projects,” becoming a nearly-autonomous, quasi-Venture Capital fund. 
The DAO sold tokens to investors in exchange for assets to fundraise for 
these “projects,”32 and the buyers of the tokens “stood to share in the 
anticipated earnings from these projects as a return on their investment.”33 
In other words, The DAO conducted a prototypical ICO.  
 The DAO garnered the SEC’s attention when it was hacked only 
one month later, allowing a few users to siphon off one third of the funds 
to a separate account.34 This prompted an SEC investigation into the token 
sale and its compliance with United States securities laws. The 
investigative report described its findings in unambiguous terms, at least 
with respect to The DAO token sale: 
Based on the investigation, and under the facts presented, the 
Commission has determined that DAO Tokens are securities under 
the Securities Act of 1933 . . . . The Commission deems it appropriate 
and in the public interest to issue this report of investigation . . . to 
advise those who would use . . . distributed ledger or blockchain-
enabled means for capital raising, to take appropriate steps to ensure 
compliance with the U.S. federal securities laws.35 
While The DAO tokens were deemed securities, and thus the sale should 
have been registered with the SEC, the Commission chose not to bring 
charges or make findings of violations in their report,36 deciding instead to 
simply caution both investors and issuers about the risks associated with 
ICOs.37 
                                               
30 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 1 (July 25, 2017) 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter “SEC 
DAO Report”]. 
31  Id. at 1. 
32 SEC DAO Report at 2–3, supra note 30. 
33 Id. 
34 Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes in the 
World of Virtual Currency, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/dealbook/hacker-may-have-
removed-more-than-50-million-from-experimental-cybercurrency-project.html.  
35 SEC DAO Report at 1–2, supra note 30.  
36 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report 
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017) (on 
file with author). 
37 See generally, SEC DAO Report, supra note 30 (describing the SEC’s 
findings and offering guidance as to SEC’s viewpoint of tokens) 
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 The SEC released an investor bulletin on Initial Coin Offerings on 
the same day as its investigative report.38 In it, the Commission opted not 
to issue a blanket determination on the status of coins or tokens,39 but once 
again cautioned that ICOs may feature an increased risk of fraud or theft.40 
Most commentators viewed this guidance as the SEC speaking with a firm 
voice regarding ICOs.41 The ICO market, however, raised nearly $1.5 
billion between August and October of 2017,42 hardly reflecting a growing 
fear of regulatory action. Throughout the fall of 2017 and first quarter of 
2018, though, the SEC has continued to issue guidance and warnings 
related to ICOs;43 meanwhile, other countries (e.g. China)44 have imposed 
outright bans. 
III. EXEMPTIONS 
It is still an open question whether all coins are securities, and thus 
whether all sales of coins must comply with SEC rules. However, it seems 
inevitable that some sort of formal regime will eventually apply to ICOs. 
Startups who hope to raise capital using digital currencies would be wise 
to develop alternative strategies that are SEC-compliant for fundraising in 
2018 and beyond.  
 Due to the high costs of registration with the SEC, the best strategy 
for any startup hoping to lawfully raise capital via an ICO is the same as 
that of a startup raising funds in the traditional way: to claim a transaction 
exemption from the requirement of registration. What follows is an 
overview of some of the most common exemptions claimed by startup 
                                               
38 SEC Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, July 25, 2017, 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings. 
39 See id. (“Depending on the facts and circumstances of each individual ICO, 
the virtual coins or tokens that are offered or sold may be securities.”) 
40 Id.  
41 See, e.g., Stan Higgins, SEC: US Securities Law ‘May Apply’ to Token Sales, 
COINDESK (July 25, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/securities-exchange-
commission-us-securities-laws-may-apply-token-sales/ (stating that the SEC’s 
Investor Bulleting “effectively end[ed] a period of doubt as to what approach the 
SEC would take.”). 
42Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule. 
com/stats.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
43 Roger Aitken, U.S. SEC Warns Over Crypto ICO’s & ‘Potentially Unlawful’ 
Celebrity Promotion, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2017 1:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/rogeraitken/2017/11/02/u-s-sec-warns-over-crypto-icos-potentially-
unlawful-celebrity-promotion/#555cdc021474.  
44 Jon Russell, China Has Banned ICOs, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/04/chinas-central-bank-has-banned-icos/. 
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issuers, and their applicability to ICOs. As will be seen, none are entirely 
workable or beneficial in the context of ICOs. 
A. 506(b) and (c) 
  Startups commonly use Rules 506(b)45 and 506(c)46 of Regulation 
D when raising capital via a private placement. Both exemptions allow the 
issuer to sell to an unlimited number of accredited investors—a formal 
status conferred only upon financially sophisticated and wealthy 
individuals47— and both restrict general advertising. Both exemptions also 
preempt state blue sky laws.48 Under 506(b), the issuer may not generally 
solicit investors, nor may it sell shares to more than thirty-five non-
accredited investors that are sophisticated (and these thirty-five must 
receive a disclosure document). The benefit of 506(b), however, lies in the 
fact that issuers may sell to an unlimited number of accredited investors. 
Therefore, so long as the issuer does not generally solicit or advertise, and 
all but thirty-five of the purchasers are accredited, the issuer may raise an 
unlimited amount of capital from an unlimited number of investors and 
still claim a 506(b) exemption. Under 506(c), general solicitation is 
permitted, provided that all purchasers are accredited. The issuer must take 
reasonable steps to verify accredited investor status.  
  Issuers that plan to raise capital via an ICO can claim either of 
these exemptions, provided they comply with the restrictions. 
Unfortunately, however, the accredited/unaccredited investor 
requirements tend to limit the reach of the offering and limit those who 
can participate in it. While the monetary threshold is unlimited, the burden 
of ensuring that investors possess accredited status removes some of the 
original decentralized, democratic allure of ICOs. 
B. Regulation Crowdfunding 
Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act,49 signed into 
law in 2012, authorized the SEC to exempt “Regulation Crowdfunding” 
from the ’33 Act’s registration requirement. Crowdfunding is a process by 
which an entity uses an internet portal to raise money from a vast pool of 
contributors; it is commonly used for charitable fundraising or financing 
specific product launches. Equity crowdfunding uses the same structure, 
                                               
45 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b). 
46 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c). 
47 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2017).  
48 Blue sky laws are state-level regulations of issuer transactions in securities. 
They generally require registration of the security and impose disclosure 
obligations, but also often feature a more rigorous “merit review” of the 
offering. 
49 Id. at Title III. 
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but allows investors to buy a small percentage of a startup, so long as the 
startup and the investor comply with certain rules and the issuer raises no 
more than a statutory maximum.50 While Regulation CF51 was billed as a 
suitable avenue for a new style of raising capital, the current statutory 
maximums make large-scale fundraising unworkable.52 
In the ICO context, however, Regulation CF may still be 
advantageous given the nature of a coin offering and the startup itself. 
While “traditional” startups often raise capital to fund functional 
improvements or strategic hires, a coin-based company’s ICO serves an 
additional purpose: generating the aforementioned network effects. When 
a newly-issued coin is the exclusive form of payment accepted for a 
startup’s service, the holders of the coin will have an incentive to purchase 
that service. While the additional infusion of capital is beneficial, the coin 
issuer is trying to generate a potential customer base as well. This goal 
dovetails nicely with the crowdfunding exemption, which allows for a 
large pool of small investors, rather than a small pool of large investors.  
C. Rule 147A  
In October 2016, the SEC made it easier for digital online 
companies to raise capital.53 The existing Rule 147 exempted wholly 
intrastate offerings (offerings in which the only participants are residents 
of the same state as the issuer) from registration.  In 2016, however, Rule 
147 was amended to incorporate a new section, Rule 147A. This new 
section “further facilitates intrastate offerings by allowing offers to be 
accessible to out-of-state residents.”54 Essentially, it allows companies 
claiming the intrastate offering exemption to advertise and solicit out-of-
state residents. This has the effect of allowing issuers to advertise their 
offerings via the internet and social media if they comply with state 
registration rules and “do business” in the state.55 Given that they are 
                                               
50Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, § 4(a)(6) (1933) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77a) 
51 Regulation CF, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274 (2015).  
52  Id. (The statutory maximum is currently set at a mere $1,070,000 in 12-month 
period). 
53 Compliance Guide, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Intrastate Offering 
Exemptions: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/intrastate-offering-exemptions-
compliance-guide-041917.htm. 
54 Id. 
55 The SEC defines “doing business” as satisfying at least one of: the issuer 
derived at least 80% of its consolidated gross revenues from the operation of a 
business or of real property located in-state or from the rendering of services in-
state, the issuer had at least 80% of its consolidated assets located in-state, the 
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primarily internet-oriented entities, digital startup companies benefit from 
this change because it allows them to reach purchasers online, even if it 
restricts those purchasers to residents of the startup’s state. 
In theory, given 147A’s facilitative nature, startups may now 
choose to “do business” in a crowdfunding-friendly state and conduct their 
ICO over the internet from there. As long as safeguards are put in place to 
restrict those purchasing to only in-state residents and these safeguards 
comply with state laws, the ICO will be exempt from registration with the 
SEC and still able to put their coins in the hands of individual investors. 
In reality, however, the intrastate limitation will likely limit the reach of 
any ICO, even without federal limits on accredited status. Additionally, 
many states limit the amount of money that can be raised via crowdfunding 
rules, so it is unlikely that Rule 147A will have a meaningful impact on 
the viability of ICOs. 
IV. FIXING A BROKEN SYSTEM 
A. The Costs of Raising Capital 
 Raising capital in the United States is inherently a capital-
intensive process. A traditional initial public offering can cost anywhere 
from $4 to $28 million in fees, depending on its size.56 Even small 
offerings can be wildly expensive if registration with the SEC is required; 
navigating the legal landscape of the U.S. financial regulatory system can 
be costly. Still, most companies have no choice but to embrace the 
complexity (and the costs) in order to gain access to the vast pool of 
American capital. 
 Given the costs associated with the SEC’s filing and disclosure 
requirements, most small companies—especially cash-strapped startups—
try to avoid registration in any way possible. As mentioned above, 
however, most of the private placement offering exemptions limit the 
number of investors who may participate or require that investors be 
accredited. General solicitation, i.e. reaching out to those with whom the 
issuer does not have an already-established relationship, is legally limited 
under nearly all of the exemptions, forcing companies to look for investors 
privately and without posting anything on the internet. Founders often 
simply rely on old-fashioned networking, seeking out key influencers to 
                                               
issuer intends to use and uses at least 80% of the net proceeds from the offering 
towards the operation of a business or of real property in-state, the purchase of 
real property located in-state, or the rendering of services in-state, or  majority 
of the issuer’s employees are based in-state. Id. 
56 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Considering an IPO?  The Costs of Going 
Public Might Surprise You, 11 (2012), https://www.strategyand.pwc. 
com/media/file/Strategyand_Considering-an-IPO.pdf. 
329           INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS: INNOVATION, [Vol. 16 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE SEC 
                   
 
secure sources of funding—a process that can be remarkably slow and 
uniquely challenging, especially in areas outside of investor-rich Silicon 
Valley.57 
  This regulatory scheme squeezes out a small, but not insignificant 
number of capital-needy startups. Those who have surpassed self-funding 
and tapped out their family and friends, but who lack sufficient 
connections to accredited investors, are stuck between the significant 
limits on solicitation of most exemptions and the physical limits of raising 
enough capital via an intrastate offering. This “regulatory Scylla and 
Charybdis”58 is a daunting gauntlet that seems remarkably at odds with the 
ever-expanding opportunities of an increasingly interconnected world. 
 Initial coin offerings arose partially in response to the SEC’s web 
of rules and exemptions. Coin-based companies and platforms, hoping to 
avoid the delay and costs of complying with financial regulation, chose to 
raise capital outside of the “traditional” system. While ICOs may only be 
“legal” because the SEC has yet to weigh in, the high costs and obstacles 
associated with traditional fundraising is enough incentive for many to 
take the risk, hence the booming ICO market in 2017.  
B. A New Exemption 
 Rather than responding to the ICO craze by subjecting coins to the 
existing regulatory framework, the SEC should consider creating a new 
exemption that alleviates some of the difficulties that produced the 
demand for ICOs in the first place. As noted previously, a startup’s ability 
to raise its initial capital is often directly correlated with the accredited 
investors in the founders’ immediate social circle. Although the 
exemptions available under the ’33 Act are useful for those small 
companies that have access to a pool of wealthy potential investors, the 
exemptions are not useful for companies without connections.59 At the 
same time, those with relatively modest means (and, thus, lacking 
accreditation) are almost entirely shut out from investing in high-potential 
startups. The U.S. regulatory scheme, while justifiably protective of the 
most vulnerable citizens, also perpetuates a status quo in which having 
money facilitates making money. 
                                               
57 See, Rutherford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Business’ Search for “A 
Moderate Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 88 (2006) (describing small 
business’s difficulties in identifying and connecting with potential investors).  
58 James D. Cox, Who Can’t Raise Capital?: The Scylla and Charybdis of 
Capital Formation, 102 KY. L.J. 849, 863 (2013) (discussing the regulatory 
difficulties for small, unconnected companies to raise capital).  
59 Id. 
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 The new exemption could take the form of an adapted and updated 
Regulation CF. While the crowdfunding exemption, as currently written, 
is largely viewed as a disappointment,60 the idea of creating an exempt 
transaction designed to facilitate raising capital via “the crowd” could be 
a good one. First, crowd-investing protects the investor by spreading risk. 
Each individual has minimal exposure, as she is merely one among many 
participants in the offering. Second, as previously mentioned, in the typical 
ICO, reaching a large pool of potential customers is itself a goal, not 
merely a means by which a coin-based startup hopes to raise money. An 
exemption that creates regulatory space for these specially-situated 
companies to accomplish their capital and distribution goals, while 
maintaining some investor protections, would prevent the current scheme 
from strangling the cryptocurrency industry in its infancy.  
 Regulators need only make a few changes to Regulation CF in 
order to usher in this new era of legal ICOs: 
 First, the limit on the amount of capital a company may raise in 
twelve months must be increased. One million dollars, while surely 
sufficient in the context of a charity drive, is too low to attract any serious 
high-potential startups. On the other hand, removing the limit entirely 
could drive inflated valuations and exploitation by startups with already-
deep pockets. 
 Second, the per-year investment limit for individuals should be 
lowered. While affording more of the population the opportunity to invest 
via ICOs is the ultimate goal, investor protections should not be discarded 
entirely. Lowering the investment limit to a flat $1,500 per year (in 
aggregate) would simultaneously prevent investors from betting the farm 
on “the next big thing” and push startups to increase the number of 
investors in an offering rather than increase the average investment.   
 Third, the ICO exemption should keep Regulation CF’s platform 
requirement, as long as coin platforms can qualify by fulfilling similar 
reporting and disclosure requirements. By forcing ICOs to be conducted 
via a set of specific platforms, the SEC will be able to easily oversee the 
actions of companies conducting the offerings, and impose new 
regulations as circumstances warrant. 
 Finally, the new exemption should continue to allow startups to 
advertise the offering online and on social media, directing would-be 
investors to the coin platform for information about the company and the 
offering. Preventing companies from reaching an online audience would 
prevent them from reaching as wide a group of investors as possible, one 
                                               
60 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: 
Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J., 195 (2012). 
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of the aforementioned principal goals of ICOs. Without the ability to 
advertise online, ICOs would be almost entirely useless. 
 ICOs, by their nature, bridge the gap between cash-strapped, 
isolated startups and eager investors with modest means. Enabling these 
types of offerings will simultaneously energize and democratize start-up 
investing in the United States, giving small-town America the chance to 
participate in funding the world’s next revolutionary idea. Moreover, 
justifying stiff regulations by claiming a dire need to protect 
unsophisticated investors smacks of misguided paternalism in an age 
where risk is spread amongst the millions willing to bet on a yet-unproven 
startup company. A gambler need not be “sophisticated” to bet money in 
Las Vegas, yet she must comply with minimum income requirements to 
“throw the dice” by backing a promising startup. The current system 
funnels investment away from entrepreneurs, leading to diminished 
innovation and sluggish growth. A new digital fundraising exemption 
could significantly increase the share of the population that is able to 
participate in the joys of funding the American dream. 
C. Fallback Plan 
 Absent a new exemption, startups will still have the option of 
shaping existing exemptions to fit their ICO needs. Indeed, working within 
the existing framework is likely to be the only way forward for ICOs, at 
least in the short term. To that end, a few workable alternatives do exist, 
although most sacrifice essential benefits of conducting an ICO. 
 As in a “traditional” private placement offering, the exemptions 
available under Rule 506(b) and 506(c) would likely be the most useful 
for a startup attempting an ICO. As mentioned previously, both rules allow 
offerings to an unlimited number of accredited investors, subject to some 
limitations. This lack of a cap on the number of potential participating 
investors is attractive for any startup, but especially for a coin-based 
startup hoping to capture some benefit from network effects. In addition, 
Rules 506(b) and (c) feature relatively minimal disclosure requirements 
and preempt state registration rules, making the offerings claiming these 
exemptions particularly cost-effective. 
 An offering under Regulation Crowdfunding, as currently written, 
would be possible but likely less desirable than a Rule 506(b) or (c) 
offering. While Regulation CF would allow the ICO to reach a large pool 
of the startup’s target coin customer base (unsophisticated investors), the 
funding cap is too low for this option to truly be attractive to many startups. 
In addition, the platform requirement and potential for increased liability 
upon the issuer add unnecessary complexity. 
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 Finally, while Rule 147A allows wholly intrastate offerings to 
simply register with the state, conducting an ICO in which only residents 
of a single state may participate would severely limit the appeal of the 
offering. It is therefore difficult to see how a Rule 147A intrastate offering 
would be desirable for any startup contemplating an ICO. 
 Thus, given the downsides of the aforementioned existing 
exemptions, a new exemption that modifies Regulation CF in a way that 
specifically benefits ICOs is clearly the best option to adapt the United 
States regulatory regime in a way that modernizes and democratizes 
fundraising while simultaneously continuing to protect investors.  
CONCLUSION 
 Initial coin offerings have garnered massive attention and 
generated soaring valuations in the second half of 2017, and the SEC 
seems poised to formally regulate ICOs in the near future. Given the 
massive costs and obstacles related to registration in the United States, the 
future of ICOs appears to be in danger. Despite the availability of a few 
existing exemptions, the unique attributes of fundraising via a coin sale, 
such as network effects and customer capture, make the exemptions of 
dubious value to digital token companies. Instead of simply forcing ICOs 
into a framework that is better suited for a more traditional capital raise, 
the United States should consider a new regulatory regime specific to coin 
offerings. Policy-makers have a responsibility to adapt regulations to the 
ever-changing digital world as the second decade of the twenty-first 
century comes to a close. Initial coin offerings would be a good place to 
start. 
